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1 Introduction
Socio-economic systems can be viewed as systems of many interacting agents or players (see
for example Santa Fe collection of papers on economic complex systems [1] and econophysics
papers on Minority Game [2]). We may then try to derive their global behavior from individual
interactions between their basic entities. Such approach is fundamental in statistical physics
which deals with systems of many interacting particles. We will explore similarities and dif-
ferences between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and
particles minimizing their interaction energy.
We will consider here game-theoretic models of many interacting agents [3, 4]. In such
models, agents have at their disposal certain strategies and their payoffs in a game depend on
strategies chosen both by them and by their opponents. In spatial games, agents are located on
vertices of certain graphs and they interact only with their neighbors [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
The central concept in game theory is that of a Nash equilibrium. A configuration of strategies
(an assignment of strategies to agents) is a Nash equilibrium, if no agent, for fixed strategies of
his opponents, can increase his payoff by deviating from his current strategy. In spatial models, a
Nash equilibrium is called a Nash configuration. We see that the notion of a Nash configuration
is similar to that of a ground-state configuration in systems of interacting particles.
In most models with many players, their strategic interaction is decomposed into a sum of
two-player games. Only recently there have appeared some systematic studies of truly multi-
player games [13, 14, 15]. Here we consider spatial games with players located on vertices of
the triangular lattice. Each agent plays six three-player games with his neighbors on the same
triangle.
One of the fundamental problems in game theory is that of the equilibrium selection in games
with multiple Nash equilibria. We will discuss here the dynamic approach to that problem. It
may happen that only some equilibria are asymptotically stable in some specific dynamics. We
will be concerned here with a particular stochastic dynamics. Namely, at discrete moments of
time, a randomly chosen player may change his strategy. He adopts with a high probability
a strategy which is the best response to strategies of his neighbors, that is a strategy that
maximizes the sum of the payoffs of individual games, and with a small probability, representing
the noise of the system, he makes a “mistake”. Such process is repeated infinitely many times.
To describe the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics, Foster and Young [16] introduced
a concept of stochastic stability. A configuration of strategies is stochastically stable if it
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has a positive probability in the stationary state of the above dynamics in the zero-noise limit,
that is the zero probability of mistakes. It means that in the long run we observe it with a
positive frequency. However, for any arbitrarily low but fixed noise, if the number of players is
big enough, the probability of any individual configuration is practically zero. It means that
for a large number of players, to observe a stochastically stable configuration we must assume
that players make mistakes with extremely small probabilities. However, as indicated by van
Damme and Weibull [17], a small probability of mistakes should involve some some cost of
learning strategies played by neighbors. To avoid paying these prohibitively big costs, players
settle for regimes with low but not extremely low noise. On the other hand, it may happen that
in the long run, for a low but fixed noise and sufficiently big number of players, the stationary
state is highly concentrated on an ensemble consisting of one Nash configuration and its small
perturbations, i.e. configurations, where most players play the same strategy. We will call such
configurations low-noise ensemble stable.
We will investigate here the effect of the noise level and the number of players on their long-
run behavior. In the first part of our paper we will consider the so-called potential games [18].
In such games, if any single player changes his strategy, then the payoff differences are the same
for all players. This is in absolute analogy to systems of interacting particles, where instead of
maximizing payoffs, particles minimize their interaction energy. We will exploit this analogy
to describe long-run behavior of potential three-player games with two Nash configurations.
We will show that a configuration can be stochastically stable but nevertheless may appear in
the long run with an arbitrarily small frequency if the number of players is large enough - it
is not low-noise ensemble stable. In the second part of our paper we will present an example
of a simple nonpotential three-player spatial game, where stochastic stability depends on the
number of players.
In Section 2, we introduce spatial three-player games. In Section 3, we compare stochas-
tic and ensemble stability in potential games. In Section 4, we discuss nonpotential games.
Discussion follows in Section 5.
2 Spatial three-player games
Let Λ be a finite subset of the triangular lattice. Every site of Λ is occupied by one player
who has at his disposal one of two different strategies. Let S = {A,B} be the set of strategies,
then ΩΛ = S
Λ is the space of all possible configurations of players. For every i ∈ Λ, Xi is
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the strategy of the i−th player in the configuration X ∈ ΩΛ and X−i denotes strategies of all
remaining players; X therefore can be represented as the pair (Xi, X−i). U : S × S × S → R
is a payoff function of our game. Without loss of generality (see a discussion below) it can be
represented by two matrices:
U =
((
a 0
0 b
)
,
(
0 0
b c
))
, (1)
where the ij entry, i, j = A,B, of the first matrix is the payoff of the first (row) player when he
plays strategy i, the second (column) player plays the strategy j and the third (matrix) player
plays the strategy A; the second matrix represents payoffs of the first player when the third
player plays the strategy B. We assume that all players are the same and hence payoffs of a
column and a matrix player can be easily deduced from the above matrices; such games are
called symmetric.
Every player interacts only with his nearest neighbors and his payoff is the sum of the
payoffs resulting from individual games (six games on the triangular lattice). We assume that
he has to use the same strategy for all neighbors. For X ∈ ΩΛ we denote by νi(X) the payoff
of the i−th player in the configuration X :
νi(X) =
∑
(j,k)
U(Xi, Xj, Xk), (2)
where the summation is with respect to six elementary triangles containing i.
Definition 1 X ∈ ΩΛ is a Nash configuration if for every i ∈ Λ and Yi ∈ S, νi(Xi, X−i) ≥
νi(Yi, X−i).
Let us note that the notion of a Nash configuration involves not only payoff functions but
also the spatial structure of players. It is similar to the notion of a ground-state configuration
in classical lattice-gas models of interacting particles. However, there are differences. One
cannot decrease the energy of a ground state-configuration by any local change of particles.
From this follows the existence of a ground-state configuration for any model with finite-range
interactions. In the definition of a Nash configuration we are allowed to make only one-site
changes. As a consequence of this restriction, a Nash configuration may not exist. We will be
not concerned here with such situations.
Let us notice that if a > 0 and c > 0, then there are two homogeneous Nash configurations:
XA and XB, where all players play the same strategy, A or B respectively. If a > 0, c < 0 and
4
b > 0, then we have a homogeneous Nash configuration XA and three configurations, related
by translations, where on every elementary triangle there are two B players and one A player.
We donote by XABB one of these configurations. We see that for above payoff parameters,
there are multiple Nash configurations. We are therefore faced with a standard game-theoretic
problem of equilibrium selection. In the following, we will discuss one of the dynamics used in
evolutionary game theory.
We start with the deterministic dynamics of the best-response rule. Namely, at each
discrete moment of time t = 1, 2, ..., a randomly chosen player may update his strategy. He
simply adopts the strategy, X ti , which gives him the maximal total payoff νi(X
t
i , X
t−1
−i ) for given
X t−1−i , a configuration of strategies of remaining players at time t− 1.
Now we allow players to make mistakes with a small probability, that is to say they may
not choose the best response. It is reasonably to expect that the probability of making an error
should increase if payoffs from alternate strategies approach the payoff of the best-response
strategy. We will consider here a well-known in statistical mechanics exponential rule which is
used in game-theoretic and economic literature under the name of the log-linear rule [5, 19].
We assume that the probability of chosing by the i−th player the strategy X ti at time t is given
by the following conditional probability:
pβi (X
t
i |X
t−1
−i ) =
eβνi(X
t
i
,Xt−1
−i
)
∑
Yi∈S e
βνi(Yi,X
t−1
−i
)
, (3)
where 1/β > 0 measures the noise level.
Let us observe that if β → ∞, pβi converges pointwise to the best-response rule. Such
stochastic dynamics is an example of an irreducible Markov chain with |SΛ| states (there is a
nonzero probability of transition from any state to any other state in finite number of steps).
Therefore, it has the unique stationary probability distribution (also called a stationary state)
denoted by µβΛ. The following definition was introduced by Foster and Young [16]:
Definition 2 X ∈ ΩΛ is stochastically stable if limβ→∞ µ
β
Λ(X) > 0.
If X is stochastically stable, then the frequency of visiting X converges to a positive number
along any time trajectory almost surely.
Stationary distributions of log-linear dynamics can be explicitly constructed for the class of
the so-called potential games [18, 19]. In such games, if any single player changes his strategy,
then the payoff differences are the same for all players. More precisely, a game is a potential
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game if there exists a function ρ : S × S × S → R, invariant under any permutation of
arguments such that for all x, x′, y, z ∈ S
U(x′, y, z)− U(x, y, z) = ρ(x′, y, z)− ρ(x, y, z) (4)
We call this function a potential of the game.
It is easy to see that ρ(A,A,A) = a, ρ(A,A,B) = 0, ρ(A,B,B) = b, ρ(B,B,B) = b + c is
a potential of an elementary three-player game defined in (1). For players on the triangular
lattice playing six elementary games, for any X ∈ ΩΛ,
ρ(X) =
∑
(i,j,k)∈△⊂Λ
ρ(Xi, Xj, Xk), (5)
is a potential of the configuration X , where a sum is taken with respect to all elementary
triangles in Λ. We have to stress here that even if an elementary game has a potential it does
not necessarily mean that a resulting spatial game has a potential. This depends upon the
spatial structure of interactions as we will see in Section 4.
We will now show that the following probability distribution is the unique stationary state
of our spatial game.
Proposition
µβΛ(X) =
e
β
∑
(i,j,k)∈△
ρ(Xi,Xj ,Xk)
∑
Z∈ΩΛ e
β
∑
(i,j,k)∈△
ρ(Zi,Zj ,Zk)
,
is the stationary state of a three-player game on the triangular lattice.
Proof:
We will show that µβΛ satisfies the detailed balance condition
µβΛ(X)P (X, Y ) = µ
β
Λ(Y )P (Y,X) (6)
for all X, Y ∈ ΩΛ, where P (X, Y ) is the transition probability from X to Y given in (3).
Then it follows that µβΛ is a stationary distribution because
∑
X∈ΩΛ
µβΛ(X)P (X, Y ) =
∑
X∈ΩΛ
µβΛ(Y )P (Y,X) = µ
β
Λ(Y )
∑
X∈ΩΛ
P (Y,X) = µβΛ(Y ).
Let us observe that Y can be different at at most one lattice site, say i, which was chosen
randomly (with probability 1/|Λ|) out of Λ. Let
D =
1
|Λ|
∑
Z∈ΩΛ e
βρ(Z)
∑
Zi∈S e
β
∑
(j,k)
U(Zi,Xj ,Xk)
.
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We have
µβΛ(X)P (X, Y ) = De
β
∑
(i,j,k)∈△
ρ(Xi,Xj ,Xk)e
β
∑
(j,k)
U(Yi,Xj ,Xk)
= De
β
∑
(i,j,k)∈△
ρ(Xi,Xj ,Xk)e
β
∑
(j,k)
U(Xi,Xj ,Xk)−ρ(Xi,Xj ,Xk)+ρ(Yi,Xj ,Xk)
= De
β
∑
(i,j,k)∈△
ρ(Yi,Yj ,Yk)e
β
∑
(j,k)
U(Xi,Xj ,Xk) = µβΛ(Y )P (Y,X)
so µβΛ satisfies the detailed balance condition which completes the proof of the proposition.
µβΛ is a so-called finite-volume Gibbs state - a probability distribution describing the equi-
librium behavior of systems of many interacting particles. In the following section, we will
investigate the stochastic stability of Nash configurations for different payoff parameters of
three-player games.
3 Stochastic and ensemble stability
Different Nash configurations of a given game usually have different values of a potential. It
follows from the explicit form of the stationary state in the Proposition that Nash configurations
with the maximal potential are stochastically stable. We obtain immediately the following
theorems.
Theorem 1 Let a, c > 0. If a > b + c, then XA is stochastically stable; if a < b+ c, then XB
is stochastically stable.
Let us notice that in our case, stochastically stable configurations appear in the long run
with the probability 1 in the zero-noise limit.
If a = b + c, then both XA and XB are stochastically stable and in the limit of zero noise
they occur with the probability 1/2.
Theorem 2 Let a > 0, c < 0, and b > 0. If a > b, then XA is stochastically stable; if a < b,
then XABB and its two translates are stochastically stable.
If a = b, then all four Nash configurations are stochastically stable and they occur with the
probability 1/4.
We see that if there are two or more Nash configurations with the maximal potential, then
the problem of equilibrium selection is still not resolved.
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Let us notice that limΛ→Z2 µ
β
Λ(X) = 0 for every X ∈ S
L, where L is the infinite triangular
lattice. Hence for large Λ and any nonzero nisewe may only observe, with reasonable positive
frequencies, ensembles of configurations and not particular configurations. It may happen that
the stationary state is highly concentrated on an ensemble consisting of one Nash configuration
and its small perturbations, i.e. configurations, where most players play the same strategy. We
will call such configurations low-noise ensemble stable.
Definition 3 X ∈ ΩΛ is low-noise ensemble stable if for every ǫ > 0, there exists β(ǫ) such
that for every β > β(ǫ) there exists Λ(β) such that µβΛ(Y ∈ ΩΛ; Yi 6= Xi) < ǫ for any i ∈ Λ if
Λ(β) ⊂ Λ.
IfX is low-noise ensemble stable, then the ensemble consisting ofX and configurations which
are different from X at few sites has probability close to one in the stationary distribution.
It may happen that only one of many stochastically stable Nash configurations is low-noise
ensemble stable. We will show that this is exactly the case of three-player games with certain
payoff parameters.
We will first consider the case of a, c > 0, b < 0, a = b+ c and therefore a < c.
We perform first the limit Λ→ Z2 and obtain a so-called infinite-volume Gibbs state
µβ = lim
Λ→Z2
µβΛ (7)
We may then apply a technique developed by Bricmont and Slawny [20, 21]. They studied
low-temperature stability of the so-called dominant ground-state configurations. It follows
directly from Theorem A in [21] that
µβ(Xi = A) > 1− ǫ(β) (8)
for any site i of the lattice and ǫ(β) → 0 as β → ∞. For b > 0 so a > c we have the
analogous inequalityfor the strategy B. The following theorem is a simple consequence of
above inequalities.
Theorem 3 Let a = b + c. If b < 0, then XA is low-noise ensemble stable and if b > 0, then
XB is low-noise ensemble stable.
Theorems 1 and 3 say that for any low but fixed level of noise and b < 0, if the number
of players is big enough, then in the long run, almost all players use A strategy. On the other
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hand, if for any fixed number of players, the noise level is lowered substantially, then both
strategies appear with frequencies close to 1/2.
Let us sketch briefly the reason of such a behavior. We assume that a < c. While it is
true that both Nash configurations have the same potential which is one-third of the payoff
of the whole system (it plays the role of the total energy of a system of interacting particles),
the XA Nash configuration has more lowest-cost excitations. Namely, if one player changes
his strategy to B, then the potential of the configuration decreases by 6a. If one player in the
XB Nash configuration changes his strategy to A, the potential of the configuration decreases
by 6c > 6a. Now, the probability of the occurrence of any configuration in the Gibbs state
(which is the stationary distribution of our stochastic dynamics) depends on the total payoff in
an exponential way. One then proves that the probability of an ensemble consisting of the XA
Nash configuration and configurations which are different from it at few sites only is much bigger
than the probability of the analogous XB-ensemble. On the other hand, configurations which
are outside XA and XB-ensembles appear with exponentially small probabilities. It means
that for large enough systems (and small but not extremely small noise level) we observe in the
stationary distribution the XA Nash configuration with perhaps few different strategies. The
above argument was made into a rigorous proof for infinite systems of corresponding lattice-gas
models of interacting particles by Bricmont and Slawny in [20, 21]. They would call XA a
dominant ground-state configuration.
We have an analogous theorem for the other class of three-player games.
Theorem 4 For a > 0, c < 0, and a = b, if a < |c|, then XA is low-noise ensemble stable; if
a > |c|, then XABB and its translates are low-noise ensemble stable.
Here the lowest-cost excitation fromXA is still 6a. Let us describe the lowest-cost excitations
from XABB. When B changes to A, then the payoff of the configuration decreases by 6b = 6a.
However, if A changes to B, the payoff decreases by |c|. Therefore, if a > |c|, then XABB has
more lowest-cost excitations and hence is low-noise ensemble stable.
4 Nonpotential three-player games
Now we will consider an example of a three-player spatial game without a potential. Players
are now placed on a finite subset of the one-dimensional regular lattice Z (for simplicity we
will assume periodic boundary conditions and therefore agents will reside on a circle). Every
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agent can play only one three-player game with his right and left nearest neighbor. Although
any single game with a payoff matrix given in (1) has a potential as before but a sum of
three-player interactions is not a potential of the spatial game. The reason for this is that if
any agent chooses a best-response strategy, he does not take into account a game with two
left or two right neighbors. However, his action may change their payoffs as a result of two
additional three-player games. Hence, µβΛ given in the Proposition is no longer a stationary
state of our stochastic dynamics. To find stochastically stable configurations, we must resort
to different methods. We will use the following tree representation of stationary states of
irreducible Markov chains [22]. Let (Ω, P ) be an irreducible Markov chain with a finite state
space Ω and the transition probabilities given by P : Ω × Ω → [0, 1]. Let us denote by µ its
unique stationary distribution. For X ∈ Ω, let an X-tree be a directed graph on Ω such that
from every Y 6= X there is a unique path to X and there are no outcoming edges out of X .
Denote by T (X) the set of all X-trees and let
q(X) =
∑
d∈T (X)
∏
(Y,Z)∈d
P (Y, Z), (9)
where the product is with respect to all edges of d. The following representation of a stationary
distribution µ was provided by Freidlin and Wentzell [22]:
µ(X) =
q(X)∑
Y ∈Ω q(Y )
(10)
for all X ∈ Ω.
We will now use the above characterisation of a stationary distribution to find stochastically
stable states in our nonpotential game for the case of a, c > 0.
Let us note that XA and XB are the only absorbing states of the noise-free dynamics.
When we start with any state different from XA and XB, then after a finite number of steps
of the best-response dynamics we arrive at either XA or XB and then stay there forever. It
follows from the above tree representation of the stationary distribution that any state different
from XA and XB has zero probability in the zero-noise limit. Moreover, in order to study the
zero-noise limit of the stationary distribution, it is enough to consider paths between absorbing
states. More precisely, we construct X-trees with absorbing states as vertices. The family of
such trees is denoted by T˜ (X) Let
qm(X) = maxd∈T˜ (X)
∏
(Y,Z)∈d
P˜ (Y, Z), (11)
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where P˜ (Y, Z) = max
∏
(W,W ′) P (W,W
′), and the last product is taken along any path joining
Y with Z on the full graph and the maximum is taken with respect to all such paths.
Now we may observe that in our three-player game, if limβ→∞qm(X
B)/qm(X
A) = 0, then
XA is stochastically stable. Therefore we have to compare trees with biggest qm in (11); such
trees we call maximal.
Now we will use the above tree representation of a stationary state in two different noise
models. We begin with a stochastic dynamics with a state-independent noise. Namely, at each
discrete moment of time, a randomly chosen agent plays the best response with the probability
1 − ǫ and with the probability ǫ he makes a mistake. Below we assume that a, c > 0 so there
are two Nash configurations, XA and XB.
Theorem 5 For the state-independent noise, if b < 0, then XA is stochastically stable, if b > 0,
then XB is stochastically stable.
Proof: The theorem follows from the observation that if b < 0, then qm(X
A) is of order ǫ and
qm(X
B) is of order ǫ|Λ|/2, and if b > 0, then it is the other way around.
Now we come back to the state-dependent log-linear noise.
Theorem 6 For the log-linear noise, if a < c, then for every small b < 0, there is K(b) such
that XA is stochastically stable if |Λ| > K(b) and XB is stochastically stable if |Λ| < K(b).
Proof: If |b| < a, then we get
qm(X
A) =
1
(1 + eβc)(1 + eβb)|Λ|−2(1 + e−βa)
, (12)
qm(X
B) =
1
(1 + eβa)(1 + e−βb)|Λ|−2(1 + e−βc)
. (13)
We also have that limb→0K(b) =∞.
For a > c and b < 0, it follows from the above expressions of qm(X
A) and qm(X
A) that XA
is stochastically stable for any number of players. We see that in nonpotential games stochastic
stability may depend upon the number of players. Let us notice that for any arbitrarily large
c and b < 0, if the number of players is sufficiently big, then in the zero-noise limit, all of them
play the inefficient strategy A which gives them the lower payoff than the strategy B in the
configuration XB.
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5 Summary
To address the problem of equilibrium selection in spatial games with many players, we in-
troduced the concept of low-noise ensemble stability. We showed that in certain symmetric
three-player games with two strategies, there exist Nash configurations that are stochastically
stable but not low-noise ensemble stable. It means that for any arbitrarily low but fixed noise,
if the number of players is large enough, then some stochastically stable strategies are played
with arbitrarily small frequencies. We also showed that for nonpotential three-player games,
stochastic stability may depend upon the number of players.
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